Abstract. We describe a new general method to perform part of the setup stage of the XTR system introduced at Crypto 2000, namely finding the trace of a generator of the XTR group. Our method is substantially faster than the general method presented at Asiacrypt 2000. As a side result, we obtain an efficient method to test subgroup membership when using XTR.
Introduction
XTR is an efficient and compact method to work with order p 2 − p + 1 subgroups of the multiplicative group GF(p 6 ) * of the finite field GF(p 6 ). It was introduced at Crypto 2000 (cf. [4] ), followed by several practical improvements a Asiacrypt 2000 (cf. [5] ). In this paper we present some further improvements of the methods from [4] and [5] . Given the rapidly growing interest in XTR our new methods are of immediate practical importance.
Let p and q be primes such that p ≡ 2 mod 3 and q divides p 2 − p + 1, let g be a generator of the order q subgroup of GF(p 6 ) * , and let T r(g) = g + g p 2 + g p 4 ∈ GF(p 2 ) be the trace over GF(p 2 ) of g. In [4] it is shown that the conjugates over GF(p 2 ) of elements of the XTR group g can conveniently be represented by their trace over GF(p 2 ), and it is shown how this representation can efficiently be computed given T r(g).
Given p and q the trace of a generator of the XTR group can be found as follows, as shown in [4] . First one finds a value c ∈ GF(p 2 ) such that F (c, X) = X 3 −cX 2 +c p X −1 ∈ GF(p 2 )[X] is irreducible over GF(p 2 ). Given an irreducible F (c, X), there exists an element h ∈ GF(p 6 ) * of order > 3 and dividing p 2 Thus, for the XTR parameter set-up process one needs to be able to test irreducibility of polynomials of the form F (c, X) = X 3 −cX 2 +c p X −1 ∈ GF(p 2 )[X]
− p + 1 such that T r(h) = c. Actually, h is a root of F (c, X). This implies that T r(g) can be computed as T r(h
I. h j = h In cases I and II we have that h j ∈ GF(p 2 ) so that F (c, X) is reducible over GF(p 2 ). In case III all h j have order dividing p 2 − p + 1 and > 3 so that F (c, x) is irreducible over GF(p 2 ) (cf. [4, Lemma 2.3.2.vi ]). Thus, if case III can quickly be distinguished from the other two cases, then the irreducibility of F (c, X) can quickly be tested. Actually, we only have to be able to distinguish between cases I and III, because case II can quickly be recognized since it applies if and only if ∆ ∈ GF(p) as in [5, Step 2 of Algorithm 3.5] is a quadratic non-residue in GF(p) (cf. [5, Lemma 3.6] ).
, and let
The following lemma describes some of the immediate properties of the polynomials G(c, X) and P (c, X) and their interrelation.
Lemma 2.2 Both G(c, X) and
can be written as the product 
Proof. It follows from Definition 2.1 and a straightforward computation that G(c, X) equals
All coefficients of G(c, X) and P (c, X) equal their own p th power, so that G(c, X) and P (c, X) are in GF(p) [X] . Because
are the roots of P (c, X). The proof now follows from the fact that
, and the well known result that the roots of a third degree polynomial over GF(p) are either in GF(p 2 ) or in GF(p 3 ).
where, depending on cases I, II, and III as identified above, the following holds: 
for j = 0, 1, 2 we find that in case III the polynomial
In case I we have for
, we find that in case I the polynomial G(c, X) factors as
This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.3.
Corollary 2.4 Depending on cases I, II, and III, the following holds:
I. P (c, X) has three roots in GF(p). II. P (c, X) has one root in GF(p) and two roots in GF(p 2 ). III. P (c, X) has three roots in GF(p 3 ) \ GF(p).
In the next section we show that we can determine irreducibility for P (c, X) faster than for F (c, X). Note that P (c, X) can be computed from F (c, X) at the cost of a small constant number of multiplications in GF(p).
Testing P (c, X) ∈ GF(p)[X] for irreducibility
Let P (c, X) ∈ GF(p)[X] as in Definition 2.1. We base our method to test P (c, X) for irreducibility over GF(p) on Scipione del Ferro's method, cf. [5, Algorithm 3.1]. We recall this algorithm as it applies to P (c, X) ∈ GF(p) [X] .
in a field of characteristic unequal to 2 or 3, do the following.
Compute the polynomial
, and compute its roots r 1,
3. If r 1 = r 2 = 0, then let u = v = 0. Otherwise, let r 1 = 0, compute a cube root u if r 1 , and let Proof. If ∆ as in Step 2 of Algorithm 3.1 is a quadratic residue in GF(p), then r 1 is in GF(p). From p ≡ 2 mod 3 it follows that all elements of GF(p) are cubes, so u as in Step 3 of Algorithm 3.1 is in GF(p) as well. It follows that P (c, X) has at least one root in GF(p) so that with Corollary 2.4 case III does not apply.
so that, with Corollary 2.4, case III does not apply. The proof now follows by observing that if ∆ is a quadratic non-residue in GF(p) and r 1 is not a cube in GF(p 2 ), then P (c, X) cannot have a root in GF(p) so that, with Corollary 2.4, case III must apply.
Lemma 3.2 reduces P (c, X)-irreducibility (and thus F (c, X)-irreducibility, cf.
Corollary 2.5) to the computation of a quadratic residue symbol, possibly followed by an actual square-root computation and a cubic residuosity test. We show that the square-root computation can be avoided by combining it with the cubic residuosity test. We first sketch our approach.
In [5] it was shown (just before Algorithm 3.5 in [5] ) that an element x of GF(p 2 ) is a cube if and only if x can be computed at the cost of 1.8 log 2 (p) multiplications in GF(p) if the trace over GF(p) of y is known (cf. Algorithm 3.4). In our application, y = x p−1 and x = r 1 with
Step 2 of Algorithm 3.1) where ∆ is a quadratic non-residue. We show that for x of this form the trace over GF(p) of x p−1 is given by an easy expression in which √ ∆ does not occur. Thus, the only substantial computation that remains to be done is the computation of the trace over GF(p) of y (p+1)/3 at the cost of 1.8 log 2 (p) multiplications in GF(p). We now present this method in more detail.
Proof. Because t is a quadratic non-residue we find that a 2 − b 2 t = 0 and that
The result follows with
The following algorithm is well known in the context of primality testing, more specifically the p + 1-test for primality (cf. [10, Section 4]).
Algorithm 3.4 To compute the trace T r(y
, given an integer n > 0 and the trace T r(y) ∈ GF(p) over GF(p) of some y ∈ GF(p 2 ) of order dividing p + 1. This algorithm takes 1.8 log 2 (p) multiplications in GF(p) assuming a squaring in GF(p) takes 80% of the time of a multiplication in GF(p).
-If n i = 1, then first replace v by vw−T r(y) and next replace w by w 2 −2.
for irreducibility over GF(p), with p unequal to 2 or 3, do the following.
Compute the polynomial
Compute the Jacobi symbol of ∆. If ∆ is a quadratic residue in GF(p), then P (c, X) is not irreducible (cf. Lemma 3.2). 4. Otherwise, if ∆ is a quadratic non-residue in GF(p), compute the trace of r
Lemma 3.3). 5. Apply Algorithm 3.4 to T r(y) = s and n = (p + 1)/3 to compute the trace over GF(p) of (r
. If the result equals 2, then r 1 is a cube in GF(p 2 ) and thus P (c, X) is not irreducible (cf. Lemma 3.2). 6. Otherwise, ∆ is a quadratic non-residue and r 1 is not a cube in GF(p 2 ) so that P (c, X) is irreducible over GF(p) (cf. Lemma 3.2). [5, Theorem 3.7] ).
Proof. Immediate from the proof of [5, Theorem 3.7] and Theorem 3.6 above.
Note
Subgroup attacks
Many cryptographic protocols can be tricked into undesirable behavior if data is used that does not have the properties prescribed by the protocol. For instance, elements of a certain group may be exchanged, but if membership of the proper group is not tested before the elements are operated upon, security may be endangered. A prominent example is the following. Let G be a cyclic, multiplicative group of prime order q (of size ≥ 160 bits) where the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be intractable, and let g be an element of order q in G. In practice, G is often constructed as a subgroup of an abelian supergroup H, such that membership of H is easily verified.
For example, if H = GF(p) * for a 1024-bit prime number p and the set {0, 1, ..., p − 1} is used to represent GF(p), then x ∈ H if and only if 0 < x < p, which can trivially be tested. Similarly, if H is the group of points (written multiplicatively) of a properly chosen elliptic curve over a finite field, then x ∈ H can simply be verified by testing that the coordinates of the 'point' x belong to the finite field and that x satisfies the curve equation. In both examples G may be chosen as g for an element g of prime order q dividing the order |H| of H. But testing if x ∈ G is less trivial and consists of verifying that x ∈ H and x q = 1. In the first example |H|/|G| is usually very large compared to q, whereas in the second example this ratio is commonly chosen to be very small.
To review why membership testing of G is crucial to maintain security we consider the Diffie-Hellman protocol. Assume that Alice calculates v A = g k A ∈ G where k A is secret and sends the result to Bob. Likewise, Bob calculates and sends v B = g k B ∈ G to Alice, where k B is supposed to be secret for Alice. The shared secret key g k A k B can then easily be computed by both Alice and Bob. The security is based on the assumption that k A or k B cannot be inferred from g, v A , and v B . This assumption may be incorrect if v A or v B is replaced by an element not in G, inadvertently or on purpose. As a first illustration, suppose that α ∈ H is of small order, say 2, and suppose that an active eavesdropper changes v A into v A ·α in transit. It follows that in this scenario the Diffie-Hellman protocol runs successfully if and only if v B is even (or, more in general, if the order of α divides k B ). In other words, the eavesdropper obtains information on k B , which is not supposed to happen.
As a second illustration, suppose that |H|/|G| is a product of small primes (cf. [8] ), and that h is an element of order |H|/|G|. If Alice somehow convinces Bob to use gh instead of g, and receives (gh) k B instead of g k B ∈ G from Bob, then Alice can easily determine h k B and thus k B mod (|H|/|G|) by using the PohligHellman algorithm (cf. [9] ). That is, Alice obtains secret information on k B if Bob naïvely uses a 'wrong' generator provided by Alice and does not check subgroup membership of the results of his own computations either. Another example is the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem (cf. [3] ) whose provable resistance against chosen ciphertext attacks relies on subgroup membership for a substantial number of elements that are exchanged in the course of the protocol.
In this paper, subgroup attacks refer to attacks that take advantage of the omission to verify membership of the subgroup G: they attack the security provided by the subgroup by replacing subgroup elements by elements from the supergroup H that do not belong to the proper subgroup. Examples of subgroup and related attacks can be found in [1] , [2] , [6] , and [11] . We implicitly assume that membership of H is verified, i.e., that all alleged elements of H are indeed elements of H, and that this verification can easily be done.
Subgroup attacks can be prevented in roughly three ways:
1. By assuring that alleged subgroup members are indeed subgroup members, i.e., performing a membership test. 2. By ensuring that the ratio |H|/|G| is small, e.g. 2.
3. By slightly adapting protocols.
We discuss these three prevention methods in more detail.
Membership test
In most practical circumstances the supergroup H is cyclic as well (as in systems based on the multiplicative group of a finite field), or the order q of G is a prime number such that H is not divisible by q 2 (as in elliptic curve cryptography, when using non-cyclic curve groups). The following result states that in these cases it suffices to do an order check, i.e., checking that x ∈ H satisfies x q = 1, to test membership of G. Proof: Assume to the contrary that H is cyclic. Then the number of elements of order dividing q is equal to q. The set G {x}, however, contains at least q + 1 elements of order dividing q; it follows that H cannot be cyclic. Furthermore, x, g is a subgroup of H of q 2 elements; it follows that q 2 divides |H|.
Thus, testing membership of G may entail an operation of cost comparable to the regular operations of the protocol. To illustrate that an order check is not sufficient in all cases, letG be any cyclic group of order q and consider the cyclic subgroup G = (g 1 , g 2 ) of the supergroup H =G 2 , where g 1 , g 2 are randomly chosen inG. In this case H is not cyclic and has order q 2 . To test membership of G it is not sufficient to check that (h 1 , h 2 ) q = (1, 1), but one needs to prove that log g 1 (h 1 ) = log g 2 (h 2 ) which usually is computationally infeasible. This is known as an instance of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem which usually is computationally infeasible. The latter example is not common in cryptographic applications, but simply serves as an illustration. From now on we will restrict ourselves to the situation that an order check is sufficient, i.e., H is cyclic or of order not divisible by q 2 .
Choosing a small ratio |H|/|G|
If one chooses the ratio r = |H|/|G| small then there exist only very few possibilities to perform subgroup based attacks. It seems widely accepted that at most log 2 (r) secret bits are leaked if membership of H is checked but membership of G is not. In ordinary multiplicative groups r can only be small if q is very large, thereby losing the 'short exponents' advantage of working in a small subgroup. The computational overhead of full size exponents can, however, be reduced by using exponents that are only as long as one typically would choose the size of a subgroup of prime order q, i.e., ≥ 160 bits (cf. [8, Lemma 2] ). Note that a small |H|/|G| ratio is common in elliptic curve cryptosystems. In XTR the supergroup H is the order p 2 −p+1 subgroup of GF(p 6 ) * , and the XTR group G is a subgroup of order q of H. In Section 5 below it is shown how membership of H can quickly be tested. Although the possibility of small values for |H|/|G| = (p 2 − p + 1)/q is not explicitly mentioned in [4] or [5] it can without difficulty be used in the XTR versions of common cryptographic protocols, thereby limiting the risk of XTR subgroup attacks. Note that the risk of subgroup attacks against XTR is also very limited if |H|/|G| is chosen as 3q 2 for a prime number q 2 of the same order of magnitude as q.
Slightly Adapting Protocols
By adding an additional step to protocols using subgroups it can be ensured that the alleged subgroup element is retracted into the subgroup before secret information is employed to it. We illustrate this for the Diffie-Hellman protocol, using the notation as introduced above. Instead of using g 
That is, performing the operations successively is crucial and, since an attacker may have chosen v A ∈ G, it is also crucial not to compute v r mod q A but v r A for the 'original' r = |H|/|G|. Since, as we assumed, the co-factor r = |H|/|G| is relatively prime with q, breaking this variant of the Diffie-Hellman protocol is as secure as the original one with a membership test incorporated into it. Many other DL based protocols and schemes that are susceptible to subgroup attacks, like the ElGamal scheme, can be adapted in a similar fashion.
Obviously, adaptation of protocols is typically a practical solution only if r is smaller than the prime order q of G, because otherwise a membership test would be more efficient. For instance, in traditional Schnorr-type subgroups systems H is the multiplicative group of a large finite field GF(p), the subgroup G has substantially smaller size q, and r is often quite large: if log 2 (p) = 1024 and log 2 (q) = 160 then log 2 (r) ≈ 864. If r > q, as in this example, then the best method we are aware of to verify subgroup membership is to check that the qth power of the element to be tested equals one (after one has verified, of course, that it is an element of H). Else, if r < q, then one may choose to slightly adapt the protocols used.
Prevention of subgroup attacks in XTR
In this section we focus on preventing subgroup attacks for XTR. Let G denote the XTR group and H the XTR supergroup of all elements of GF(p 6 ) * of order > 3 and dividing p 2 −p+1. We describe efficient ways to determine if an element in GF(p 2 ) is the trace of an element of H. The results from the previous section, e.g. choosing |H|/|G| small and using short exponents, can then be used to obtain variants of XTR that are not susceptible to subgroups attacks.
Let d be the element of GF(p 2 ) \ GF(p) to be verified. The first method consists simply of checking that F (d, X) is irreducible over GF(p 2 ) (cf. [4, Remark 2.3.3]), which can be done at the cost of 1.8 log 2 (p) plus a small constant number of multiplications in GF(p) (cf. Theorem 3.6).
Our second method is effectively free from a computational point of view because it requires only a small constant number of operations in GF(p), but it requires a small amount of additional communication. Let p, q, and T r(g) be as above and let d ∈ GF(p 2 ) be the element to be verified, i.e., the element that is supposedly the trace of an element, say h, of the XTR group g . Corollary 5.9 below shows that if one sends T r(h · g) along with d(= T r(h)), then one can efficiently verify that d corresponds to the trace of an element of the XTR supergroup H. 
is a ninthdegree polynomial over GF(p 2 ) with non-zero constant term.
Proof: Fixing R(X) and varying S(X) one finds that the coefficients of the polynomial (R, S) are symmetric polynomials in the roots β 0 , β 1 , β 2 of S(X), and that they can be written (cf. [7] ) as linear sums of elementary symmetric polynomials in β 0 , β 1 , β 2 with fixed coefficients depending on α 0 , α 1 , α 2 . It also follows that these fixed coefficients are symmetric polynomials in the roots α 0 , α 1 , α 2 . The values of the elementary symmetric polynomials in α 0 , α 1 , α 2 and
, so that the coefficients of the polynomial (R, S) are in GF(p 2 ). The remainder of the lemma is straightforward.
Proof: The first part result is a straightforward verification and the second part follows from the fact that the roots of S(X) are conjugate over GF(p 2 ) if S(X) is irreducible over GF(p 2 ).
Note that β 0 · β 1 · β 2 in Lemma 5.3 equals the constant term of S(X). The crucial aspect of the second part of the lemma is that it describes (R, S) using only R(X) and the conjugates of the roots of S(X). That is, if we consider the representation of GF(p 6 ) that follows by adjoining a root of S(X) to GF(p 2 ), we can efficiently determine the root-product of R(X) and S(X), assuming we can efficiently determine the (p 2 ) th and (p 4 ) th powers of a root of S(X) in this representation.
In our application S(X) is F (c, X) where c = T r(g) for some element g in the XTR supergroup H. That is, F (c, X) is irreducible by [4 
